How Trump manages relations with allies
By Alejandra Marquez Janse, Christopher Intagliata, Juana Summers
Monday, April 20, 2026 β’ 4:49 PM EDT
Heard on All Things Considered
Transcript
JUANA SUMMERS, HOST:
Canada's strong ties to the U.S. have become a weakness. Those are the words of Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney in a video address to the nation on Sunday. In another part of the program, we'll dig into Canada's perspective in more detail. But for now, we want to take a few minutes to look at the U.S.-Israel war with Iran and how President Trump's increasingly chaotic messaging about the ceasefire and where things go next is affecting the standing of the U.S. globally. To do that, we've called up Richard Haass. He was principal adviser to Secretary of State Colin Powell during the George W. Bush administration and president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations. Welcome back.
RICHARD HAASS: Good to be with you.
SUMMERS: Richard, I want to start, if you can, just with what Carney said. Were you surprised?
HAASS: Well, it's been some time in coming, and I think that the Canadians have essentially made the decision that they need to - how would I put it - diversify their economic portfolio and distance themselves from the United States, by the way, not just economically but strategically. That - you know, it's really interesting. Historically, the idea when you had close ties with someone, it would be seen as a sign of mutual advantage, and Canada came to see it as a sign of Canadian disadvantage.
SUMMERS: Is a relationship with the U.S. a strategic weakness now for many of our longtime allies?
HAASS: I wouldn't call it quite a strategic weakness, but the fact that they are asking questions about it tells you all you need to know. Up to now, until recently, it was seen as the most sensible, by far, the preferred way to go - heavy reliance on the United States. We were seen as reliable, dependable and that we had their best interests at heart. And what I think you see now is two things. One is the United States is no longer seen as either reliable or predictable. And secondly, in part because of the widespread use of tariffs, economic proximity, if you will, to the United States has been seen as a source of vulnerability.
So I would think around the world - national security advisers, prime ministers, foreign ministers and the like - are rethinking their relationship with the United States and asking themselves, how can we put fewer eggs in the American basket economically and strategically? And what are our alternatives? How self-reliant can we become? What other trading partners can we find, and so forth?
SUMMERS: Let me put that question to you. If the U.S. is increasingly being seen as unreliable, what alternatives do many of our longtime allies have?
HAASS: Well, economically, they find other trading partners. Strategically, they've really only got three choices. They can become more self-reliant, build up their own military might. Some might actually, one day, sooner rather than later, think about nuclear arms. Secondly, they can try to find new strategic partners. The Europeans - you see some of that going on, or greater - moving closer to one another. Thirdly, they may decide they have to appease or assuage - I'll use a more gentle word - some near enemy, and they need to come to better terms with it.
It'll be very interesting, for example, in the Middle East, whether once things - if and when they're settled, whether several countries there say, well, we can't rely on the United States nearly as much as we used to. To what extent do we have to cozy up to Iran to avoid a new outbreak of fighting?
SUMMERS: I mean, there are a couple of adages that stick in my mind - one being crazy like a fox. So is there a strategic value in keeping folks on their toes? In other words, does President Trump increase the likelihood that the Iranians will come to an agreement if they're just not sure what's going to happen next?
HAASS: I would not think so. Iran has shown it has tremendous resilience. It's able to take a punch. My guess is quite a few in the Iranian leadership, and let's just posit, it's very hard to know exactly...
SUMMERS: Right.
HAASS: ...The composition and nature of the new Iranian leadership. But I think quite a few of them have decided time is more on their side than the United States, given economic and political pressures. So when the president threatens them - and these threats have come and gone - I don't think they take them that seriously. What they do take seriously, and it's probably our greatest form of leverage - and it's the reason over a month ago, I advocated or introduced the idea of a blockade - is the Iranian economy is their Achilles' heel. It was their weakest feature before the war. The war has made things worse. And that's where we can get some leverage.
SUMMERS: This war started with the U.S. and Israel striking Iran. Then after the war started, Trump began publicly asking allies to get involved. From your view, how different is this approach from how prior administrations have assembled coalitions for a war, especially when we're talking about a war that might have predictably large disruptions to the global economy?
HAASS: There's an old saying in diplomacy. If you want people involved in the landings, you've got to have them involved in the takeoff. And we violated that adage. We didn't consult with them. We didn't get them on board. Plus, particularly the European allies - they're not all that directly dependent on Middle Eastern energy. Plus, this is outside the NATO treaty area, so this is much more of a discretionary operation at best.
SUMMERS: I do want to ask you about NATO. I mean, throughout this war, we've heard President Trump ridicule our allies. He's called U.K. warships toys. He's referred to NATO, among other things, as a paper tiger. He's called our European allies cowards - his words. Where do you think NATO goes from here?
HAASS: NATO is in bad shape. You know, people say can the president unilaterally take the United States out of it? It doesn't matter that much. NATO's been reduced to something of a shell. There's more form there than substance. I speak to European leaders a lot. I don't know too many who believe that the United States will be there for them if push were to ever come to shove. So NATO still exists, but it's almost like your appendix. It's not doing a whole lot of work anymore.
SUMMERS: We've also heard President Trump criticize Japan, South Korea and Australia for not helping the U.S. in Iran. Where does this war and the president's messaging about it leave our alliances in the Pacific region?
HAASS: They are actually much more affected by the energy shutdown, and a lot of them - particularly Australia - doesn't have large storage capabilities, so they're hurting. But, again, the Australian prime minister has gone on record saying he opposes this war. They weren't asked about it. So this is a real breakdown of America's alliances. And I think, again, you'll see in Asia, as in Europe, our partners, our allies, looking for alternative arrangements. Some of them may, for example, move economically closer to China.
Some of them might be thinking, particularly in South Korea - you're going to have a serious conversation there about nuclear weapons. Some 70- to 80% of the South Korean people seem to support that in polls, and they have to face both China and North Korea. So what you're beginning to see are some of the tectonic plates of history are moving, where the era of American influence is waning, largely by our own decision, and countries that have depended on us are beginning to look for alternatives.
SUMMERS: Last thing, and we've got just about a minute left here. I wonder - this chaotic messaging, what do you think the effect overall has been on how the U.S. is viewed on the world stage?
HAASS: I don't think it helps. Great powers should not be erratic, should not be inconsistent. Deterrence of your foes depends upon consistency, also, so does reassurance of your allies, so, by the way, does your ability to negotiate. So when the United States keeps changing its talking points, when we project confusion, I don't think it builds any confidence in us. It doesn't reassure. It doesn't deter. So I think it actually works against the goal of having a successful, negotiated end to this conflict.
SUMMERS: That is Richard Haass, a senior counselor with Centerview Partners, an international investment banking advisory firm. He's also president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations. Thanks so much.
HAASS: Thank you.
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